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Abstract
This article develops a sociological analysis and critique of including socioeconomic
factors such as education, employment, income and housing in risk assessment tools
that inform sentencing decisions. In widely used risk assessment tools such as the Level
of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) (Canada, US), the Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) (US), the Offender
Assessment System (OASys) (UK) and the Recidive InschattingsSchalen (RISc) (the
Netherlands), socioeconomic marginality contributes to a higher risk score, which
increases the likelihood of a (longer) custodial sentence for underprivileged offenders
compared to their more privileged counterparts. While this has been problematized in
relation to gender and racial/ethnic bias, the problem of socioeconomic bias in itself has
received little attention. Given the already marginalized position of many justice
involved individuals and longstanding concerns about such disparities, and the adverse
effects of imprisonment on socioeconomic opportunities, it is essential to evaluate the
unintended social consequences of assessing socioeconomic marginality as ‘risk factor’.
Elaborating on earlier critiques, I conceptualize risk-based sentencing as a meaning-
making process through which (access to) resources and recognition are distributed
among offender populations. Through tracing in detail two cultural processes – stigma-
tization and rationalization – I analyse how risk assessment is likely to produce
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sentencing disparities as well as to reproduce, and possibly exacerbate, social inequal-
ities more generally.
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Introduction
The use of actuarial risk assessment tools in sentencing decisions has become
common practice in various jurisdictions such as several states in the US,
Canada, the Netherlands and the UK (e.g. Fitzgibbon, 2008; Hannah-Moffat,
2013; Harcourt, 2007; Monahan and Skeem, 2015; Starr, 2015; van Wingerden
et al., 2016). Criminologists and legal scholars have criticized risk assessment
tools for their potential bias against racial/ethnic minorities and women, which
could result in sentencing disparities (e.g. Chenane et al., 2015; Hannah-Moffat,
2009, 2016; Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto, 2010; Harcourt, 2007; Holtfreter and
Cupp, 2007; Monahan, 2006; Petersilia and Turner, 1987; Skeem and Lowenkamp,
2016; Skeem et al., 2016; Smykla, 1986; Tonry, 1987, 2014; Whiteacre, 2006). While
many scholars have pointed to the role of assessing socioeconomic factors in pro-
ducing ethnic/racial and gender bias, relatively little attention has been given to the
problem of socioeconomic bias in itself (but see Goddard and Myers, 2016; Starr,
2014, 2015; Tonry, 2014; more below). Widely used risk assessment tools such as
the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) (used in Canada and the US), the
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions
(COMPAS) (US), the Offender Assessment System (OASys) (UK) and the
Recidive InschattingsSchalen (RISc) (the Netherlands), which are applied to general
offender populations, include socioeconomic factors such as education, employ-
ment, financial situation and accommodation. This is problematic because, put
simply, socioeconomic marginality contributes to a higher risk score, which in
turn could translate into more severe sentences for these individuals (e.g. incarcer-
ation instead of a community sanction, or a longer sentence) compared to their
more privileged counterparts. Early critics of risk assessment have pointed out
that socioeconomic factors such as employment and education are ‘class-based
variables that, in effect, discriminate against the poor’ (Smykla, 1986: 130–131)
and that such factors ‘should be forbidden’ in sentencing criteria (Tonry, 1987:
408). More recently, Starr (2014, 2015) has offered an elaborate critique of ‘pun-
ishing based on poverty’ and the ‘scientific rationalization of discrimination’, while
Goddard and Myers (2016) have described risk-based assessment as ‘evidence-
based oppression’ of marginalized youth.
This largely conceptual article builds and elaborates on these critiques in order
to develop a sociological analysis that focuses more explicitly on how including
socioeconomic marginality as a risk factor in sentencing decisions reproduces – and
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possible exacerbates – disparities in sentencing as well as social inequality more
generally. Using the sociological concept of ‘cultural process’ (Lamont et al., 2014),
I conceptualize sentencing based on risk assessment as a process through which
resources and recognition are distributed, based on meaning-making through iden-
tification and rationalization. In the next section I briefly discuss the role of socio-
economic factors in risk assessment tools. I then introduce the concept of ‘cultural
process’ and examine how risk-based sentencing is likely to reinforce disparities
and inequalities as it works to distribute opportunities and resources differently
among convicted individuals based on their socioeconomic status. The article ends
with outlining several directions for further research and debate.
The practice and problem of including socioeconomic
marginality in risk assessment tools
Including socioeconomic factors in assessment tools is by no means a recent devel-
opment. For example, the first American risk assessment tool developed by Burgess
in the 1920s included ‘work record’ (for an overview of early risk assessment tools,
see Oleson, 2011). So-called second-generation tools such as the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and Static-99, typically only include static factors –
criminal history and certain demographic characteristics such as age – that may
change over the life course but cannot be targeted through intervention (for an
overview, see Hamilton, 2015). It is with the development of third-generation ‘risk/
needs’ assessment tools that aim to address ‘dynamic risk factors’ or ‘criminogenic
needs’ that socioeconomic factors were reintroduced (Andrews and Bonta, 2010).
The most well-known example probably is the LSI-R, developed in the 1980s in
Canada (Andrews and Bonta, 2010; for a detailed history, see Maurutto and
Hannah-Moffat, 2006). The LSI-R is also the most commonly used tool in
American jurisdictions (Hamilton, 2015; Harcourt, 2007). The tool is based on
Andrews and Bonta’s (2010) ‘psychology of criminal conduct’ theory and assesses
the ‘Central Eight’ domains that are related to reoffending, among which is ‘social
achievement’ (initially based on Gendreau et al., 1996). The tool consists of 54
items of which 10 items that measure education and employment (e.g. ‘currently
employed’, ‘never employed for a full year’, ‘ever fired’, ‘less than grade 10/12’),
two items that measure financial situation (‘financial problems’, ‘reliance on social
assistance’) and three items that measure accommodation (e.g. ‘unsatisfactory
housing’, ‘residential stability’) (Caudy et al., 2013; Hamilton, 2015).
Comparable risk/needs assessment tools are the OASys which is used in the UK
(Robinson, 2003), the RISc (translates as Recidivism Assessment Scales) in the
Netherlands (van Wingerden et al., 2016) and the COMPAS in several American
states (Hamilton, 2015; New York State (NYS), 2015). All three tools inform
treatment as well as sentencing and parole decisions and include items that measure
education/employment, financial situation and accommodation (Fitzgibbon, 2008;
NYS, 2015; van Wingerden et al., 2016). For example, the RISc consists of 62 items
in total, divided among 12 scales (3–8 items per scale) such as ‘accommodation’
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(4 items), ‘education, work and training’ (7 items) and ‘financial management and
income’ (4 items); specific items include ‘problematic employment history’, ‘unem-
ployed/unable to work’, ‘work experience’, ‘lack of work skills’, ‘no education/
diploma’, ‘depends on others for income’, ‘financial problems’, ‘debts’, ‘history
of homelessness’, and ‘no suitable/permanent accommodation’ (van Wingerden
et al., 2016).
Socioeconomic factors can make up 10 to 25 per cent of the total number of
items assessed. For example, socioeconomic factors are assessed in 15 of 62 items in
total in the RISc, 15 of 54 items in the LSI-R; and add up to 10 of 100 points in the
OASys Violence Predictor (OVP), a variation of OASys for violent offenders
(Howard and Dixon, 2013). Their exact contribution to the overall risk score
may differ when items are weighted, which is not always transparent as sometimes
algorithms are proprietary (e.g. COMPAS). Furthermore, some of the other items,
such as those assessing leisure activities, seem correlated with socioeconomic status
(see Goddard and Myers, 2016). But even if socioeconomic factors would contrib-
ute little to the overall risk score, they could and do make the difference between
assessing an individual as ‘low’ or ‘moderate’ risk, or ‘moderate’ or ‘high’ risk
(Starr, 2014, 2015). Thus, that socioeconomic factors are among many factors
assessed cannot be an argument to disregard potential social consequences.
Regardless of how other items are scored, underprivileged individuals are con-
fronted with a higher risk score and, consequently, are more likely to face a cus-
todial sentence or to face a longer custodial sentence, compared to their more
privileged counterparts.
A critical evaluation of socioeconomic factors in risk assessment tools is
essential given concerns among scholars as well as criminal justice actors about
socioeconomic disparities in sentencing (Holder, 2014; Reiman and Leighton, 2016;
van Wingerden et al., 2016; Western, 2006). As Starr notes, basing risk assessment
on socioeconomic factors means using ‘dry, technical language to obscure discrim-
ination that we would otherwise never accept’ (2015: 229). Furthermore, ‘if judges
or policymakers would be embarrassed to embrace ideas like ‘‘we should increase
people’s sentences for being poor’’ openly, then they should not do so covertly by
relying on a risk score that is substantially driven by such factors’ (Starr, 2015).
‘Covert’ here should not be read as meaning ‘biased interpretation’ of items that
turn out to disadvantage certain social categories. To the contrary, and unlike
racial/ethnic and gender biases, socioeconomic bias results from direct discrimin-
ation on the basis of socioeconomic marginality: it is a built-in bias. ‘Covert’ in
Starr’s remark rather refers to the fact that many of the people involved (defend-
ants, lawyers), let alone the general public, are not aware that risk assessment
instruments inform sentencing decisions, or they do not know which and how
individual characteristics are assessed (Starr, 2015). Nonetheless, it may well be,
given the widespread support for current risk assessment tools, also among judges
(e.g. Kopf, 2015; Wolff, 2008), that judges and policymakers would not be embar-
rassed at all to defend sentencing based on socioeconomic status, as long as it can
be maintained that doing so contributes to public safety.
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It could be argued that risk assessment intends to discriminate (in the sense of
‘differentiate’) based on socioeconomic status because socioeconomic factors have
predictive validity: research shows that problems related to employment, educa-
tional, finances and housing are criminogenic factors and, more specifically, that
they predict reoffending (a widely cited source is Gendreau et al., 1996; specific
evaluations of the predictive validity of socioeconomic factors include Andrews
and Bonta, 2010; Howard and Dixon, 2013; Johnson et al., 2011; Raynor et al.,
2000). If socioeconomic factors improve predictions of reoffending, it could
be argued that it is irresponsible, in terms of public safety, to not include such
factors in sentencing decisions. There is an argument to be made that the results of
validity studies are inconclusive (e.g. Austin et al., 2003; Brennan et al., 2009;
Caudy et al., 2013; Petersilia and Turner, 1987). But rather than debating the
predictive validity, I wish to draw attention to the consequences of assessing socio-
economic marginality as risk factor. Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence
indeed points towards predictive validity, an evaluation of the outcomes requires
that we take into account both intended (public safety, efficiency) and unintended
outcomes (disparities, social inequality). In the 1980s, the use of factors such as
education, vocational skills, employment record, income and residential stability
was generally seen as ‘inappropriate’ for including in sentencing decisions by
American courts and parole boards (Tonry, 1987). Both the Minnesota sentencing
guidelines (1980) and the Sentencing Reform Act (1984) stated that such factors
could not be used in sentencing decisions due to their ‘socially skewed impact’
(Tonry, 1987: 398). Similarly, for race and race-related items, it has been decided
that discrimination and racial disparities are not acceptable, and thus race and
race-related items have been removed from predictive instruments (Harcourt,
2007; Tonry, 2014). Evaluating the legitimacy of practices based on criteria such
as validity and evidence base thus is too limited, as it pushes aside moral questions
and brushes over social-political, economic and cultural conditions that shape
socioeconomic marginality (cf. Goddard and Myers, 2016; Hannah-Moffat,
2016; Silver, 2000). Rather, we need to evaluate risk assessment in its moral and
social context.
Furthermore, analysing the potential discriminatory effects of risk assessment
has broader relevance. First, research in various countries has pointed to socio-
economic and racial disparities in sentencing (e.g. Kutateladze et al., 2014; Millie
et al., 2007; Reiman and Leighton, 2016; van Wingerden et al., 2016) and risk
assessment based on socioeconomic factors could play a role in how such dispa-
rities emerge. Second, there is increasing academic interest, particularly related to
mass incarceration in the US, in understanding how punishment, especially impris-
onment, might reinforce socioeconomic inequality more generally, considering the
adverse effects of prison sentences on education, work and income (Pager, 2008;
Wakefield and Uggen, 2010; Western, 2006; Western and Pettit, 2010). Such
adverse effects may also exist in less unequal and less punitive societies, such as
the Netherlands (Ramakers et al., 2014). It is difficult to determine whether certain
sentencing practices merely reflect existing inequalities, or whether such practices in
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themselves create or reinforce inequalities, because offender populations are dis-
proportionally often socioeconomically marginalized and disadvantaged (Loeffler,
2013; Ramakers et al., 2015; Wakefield and Uggen, 2010). One way to gain more
insight into the ways in which sentencing disparities emerge and in how sentencing
might in itself produce inequality, is to trace in more detail the processes through
which sentences are imposed and how this impacts opportunities and resources.
This article aims to do so by zooming in on the role of risk assessment.
It should be noted that risk/needs assessment tools may be used for multiple
purposes, ranging from informing sentencing and parole decisions to guiding deci-
sions on treatment and supervision (Hannah-Moffat, 2005; Monahan and Skeem,
2015). This article focuses on the role of risk assessment in sentencing decisions. It is
particularly in sentencing decisions that including socioeconomic factors is prob-
lematic – more so than in decisions about supervision and treatment (cf. Starr,
2014). In reality, however, the goals of sentencing and treatment cannot always be
separated, as judges may impose treatment conditions as part of a sentence. I
return to the intertwining of risk and needs assessment, and sentencing and treat-
ment later in this article. For analytical purposes I simplify the decision-making
process and focus on the potentially differentiating effect of a convicted individual’s
risk score in two types of decisions: (1) whether or not to impose a custodial
sentence (jail or prison), as opposed to diversion (a community sentence, treatment
or fine) – as is for example explicitly the goal in the state Virginia (Kleiman et al.,
2007) – and (2) determining the duration of a custodial sentence – including eligi-
bility for parole, which in effect is also a decision about the duration of imprison-
ment (Harcourt, 2007). In the following section I examine in more detail how risk
assessment could reinforce disparities and inequality.
Tracing the cultural processes that produce social inequality
Statistics on the incarcerated population in the US show that socioeconomic dispa-
rities have increased significantly between 1980 and 2010: ‘the spectacular growth in
the American penal system over the last three decades was concentrated in a small
segment of the population, among young minority men with very low levels of edu-
cation’ (Western and Pettit, 2010: 18). But also in countries with lower levels of
inequality and lower incarceration rates, the population that is under control of
the criminal justice system tends to be poorer, lower skilled andmore often homeless,
compared to the general population. In the Netherlands, for instance, the labour
market position of convicted individuals prior to their imprisonment is already
weak: ‘Starting with a low educational attainment, their subsequent employment
career is characterized by long periods of unemployment, ‘‘off-the-books’’ employ-
ment, dismissals and job shifts’ (Ramakers et al., 2014: 65). Starr (2014, 2015) has –
in her elaborate critique on ‘evidence-based sentencing’ in the US – made the point
that including socioeconomic factors in risk assessment will increase sentencing
disparities rather than reduce them. Risk assessment classifies as ‘higher risk’ exactly
those social categories that are already overrepresented in the criminal justice
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system: the un- or low-skilled, the unemployed and the unhoused. When sentencing
decisions, especially decisions about whether or not to incarcerate someone, are
partly based on evaluations of socioeconomic status, as is done through risk assess-
ment, the link between sentencing and socioeconomic status is reinforced. Harcourt
(2007) has called this the ‘ratchet effect’: prediction instruments and profiling prac-
tices increase the disproportionality between the composition of the actual offender
population and the population that is in some way under control of the criminal
justice system. Harcourt stresses that it is important to recognize that this effect is
produced even if the relationship between socioeconomic marginality and reoffend-
ing is real (i.e. not an artefact of criminal justice policies and practices). Whether
‘evidence based’ or not, a greater focus on particular groups – more policing, more
prosecution, more imprisonment, longer sentences – means that their share in the
total population that is under control of the criminal justice system will grow, and
continue to grow, and that disparities will increase (Harcourt, 2007).
Moreover, when sentencing affects an individual’s opportunities in life, it also
shapes social inequality in societies more generally. Following Fraser (1995), we
can broadly define social inequality as the unequal distribution of (access to)
resources that matter for people’s quality of life and wellbeing, including material
and immaterial resources as well as recognition (cf. Lamont et al., 2014). Various
studies have demonstrated the adverse effects of (length of) imprisonment on edu-
cational achievement, employment opportunities, income and housing (e.g. Apel
and Sweeten, 2010; Pager, 2008; Ramakers et al., 2014; Western, 2006). In this way,
we can understand sentencing – and criminal-justice decisions more generally – as a
social process through which resources are distributed and, consequently, social
inequality is either reduced or reinforced. Even if adverse effects are largely selec-
tion effects (because the offender population is already underprivileged, see
Loeffler, 2013), it seems safe to say, based on research, that imprisonment makes
it difficult for individuals to maintain, let alone improve, the quality of their life and
wellbeing (e.g. Dirkzwager et al., 2014). The ‘best case’ scenario is thus that senten-
cing based on biased risk assessment merely reproduces inequality; in the worst
case it exacerbates inequality.
To better understand how this would work, I draw on the work of Lamont et al.
(2014) to conceptualize sentencing based on risk assessment as a decision process
that is grounded in two ‘cultural processes’: identification and rationalization.
Cultural processes link cognitive categorizations in people’s minds, on the one
hand, and the distribution of important resources and recognition, on the other.
Put differently, through ‘inter-subjective meaning-making’ people create shared
classification systems that ‘sort out’ people and actions (Lamont et al., 2014:
582). When classification systems inform actual decisions that impact people’s
life, the sorting out of people is translated into the (unequal) distribution of
resources among categories of people, thus shaping access to resources and hier-
archies of status and worth. It is in particular the state, Lamont et al. (2014: 585)
argue, that ‘wields immense power in shaping and legitimizing systems of categor-
ization’ through designing and executing laws and social programs. They further
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stress that the production of inequality does not have to be intentional; it could be
an unintended consequence of other, intentional actions. Without making any
assumptions about punitive sentiments – either of governments or of the general
public, or both – towards socially marginalized groups, the analytical approach
proposed by Lamont and colleagues is to trace the processes through which
resources and recognition are distributed. In this way, we can shed new light on
the relation between sentencing, particularly imprisonment and social inequality.
Lamont et al. (2014) have theorized that ‘identification’ and ‘rationalization’ are
two broad types of cultural processes that are central in producing inequality.
Identification is ‘the process through which individuals and groups identify them-
selves, and are identified by others, as members of a larger collective’; stigmatiza-
tion, or the negative qualification of identities, is an example (Lamont et al., 2014:
587). Rationalization, famously described by Max Weber, broadly refers to ‘the
displacement of tradition and values as motivation for action by a means-end
orientation’, for example through standardization and evaluation (Lamont et al.,
2014: 591). Both processes are central in risk assessment based on socioeconomic
marginality (cf. Silver, 2000). Risk assessment evaluates socioeconomic marginality
negatively, first by the mere fact that it is included as a risk factor, second by
prescribing that a higher overall risk factor is interpreted to mean a greater
danger to the public and thus should translate into a higher sentence. Both
Harcourt (2007) and Starr (2014, 2015) have pointed to the symbolic message
that is associated with disproportionate sentencing based on certain offender char-
acteristics. Starr is concerned with treating poverty as a risk factor, which ‘is also
endorsing a message: that it considers certain groups of people dangerous because
of who they are, not what they have done’ (2015: 230). Profiling based on predic-
tion about who will (re)offend comes with a social cost, Harcourt (2007) argues,
because it tends to create unintended stigma that attaches to, in this case, the
unemployed, unskilled and unhoused. Incarceration or longer sentences for offen-
der categories who are assessed as higher risk because of their socioeconomic status
reinforces the negative identification of socioeconomic marginality. Through defin-
ing which social categories are worthy of beneficial policies and which categories
deserve punitive policies, policymakers allocate resources (Gans, 1995). Public
policies in turn send messages about which categories are deserving and what are
appropriate kinds of attitudes towards them (Schneider and Ingram, 1993).
Deserving citizens are supported, while undeserving citizens tend to be punished.
In sentencing decisions this means: socioeconomically ‘integrated’ or ‘productive’
offender categories – those who are skilled, employed or employable, and with a
stable residence – are more deserving of diversion away from imprisonment, so that
they can maintain their socioeconomic status. Socioeconomically marginal offender
categories, on the other hand, are undeserving of diversion and, consequentially, of
the opportunity to improve their socioeconomic status, as their options to develop
a mainstream way of life are hindered during and after imprisonment. In addition,
when risk assessment is legitimized based on the supposed benefits of diversion for
low-risk individuals, while the costs of non-diversion for high-risk individuals (i.e.
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incarceration and all its consequences) are ignored, the message is reinforced that
convicted individuals who are also underprivileged are less worthy of opportunities
to improve their life.
What is more, risk assessment reinforces the notion that socioeconomic margin-
ality is the sole responsibility of the individual (Goddard and Myers, 2016;
Hannah-Moffat, 2016). This is not surprising, given that current risk assessment
tools are grounded in a social-psychological theory of offending that looks for
explanations related to the individual rather than to society (Andrews and
Bonta, 2010). But it does more. Andrew and Bonta’s argument for including socio-
economic achievement in the LSI-R tool on the ground that it is an ‘achieved’
status, as opposed to ‘social class’ (family background) which would be an
‘ascribed status’, is consistent with the dominant cultural narrative in contempor-
ary Western societies that we live in ‘classless’ societies in which people shape their
own life course (e.g. Beck, 1992; Lamont, 2000; Savage, 2000; van Eijk, 2013).
However, research in Europe and the US shows that opportunity structures are
less open than we would expect in classless societies: people’s educational and
income level still depend on the socioeconomic status of their parents (Causa
and Johansson, 2009; Putnam, 2015). In addition, structural factors such
as rising inequality hamper intergenerational social mobility (Corak, 2013).
Socioeconomic opportunities more generally are also affected by welfare reforms,
economic crises and stagnating wages for low- and mid-level jobs, which have led
to a growing number of people, including those who are working, living in poverty.
By disregarding the social and historical context of the marginal positions of social
groups, risk assessment individualizes socioeconomic marginality and thus shifts all
responsibilities to individuals not only for the crime they have committed but also
for their socioeconomic status (Goddard and Myers, 2016; Hannah-Moffat, 2016;
see also Hannah-Moffat and Maurutto, 2010, on the individualization of gendered
and racial inequality). The individualization of class is in a specific way problematic
for individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system repeatedly,
as social structures can enable as well as constrain possibilities for agency in desis-
tance processes (Farrall et al., 2010; Hannah-Moffat, 2016). For example, the tran-
sition to knowledge economies has meant fewer low-skilled jobs and a
reconfiguration of ‘employability’, while the recent financial crisis has impacted
overall unemployment rates; housing and urban policies have resulted in a smaller
stock of affordable housing; and increasingly punitive criminal policies have meant
fewer resources to support convicted and formerly incarcerated individuals with
‘reintegrating into the mainstream society’ in favour of managing risky populations
(Farrall et al., 2010). A final structural barrier is the way in which social institutions
ranging from housing associations and private landlords to educational institutions
and employers manage risks by excluding people who have a criminal record (e.g.
Carey, 2004; Pager, 2008). For individuals who cycle in and out of the criminal
justice system, assessing socioeconomic factors could mean that they get caught up
in a vicious cycle of being punished more severely due to a higher risk score based
on socioeconomic marginality, which in turn results in limited opportunities to get
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back on track, which in case of a repeated conviction and assessment results in a
higher risk score, and so on and so forth. In this way, risk policies combined with
risk assessment create double punishments for repeat offenders, and in this way
makes them even more marginalized (Goddard and Myers, 2016).
From a legal-philosophical standpoint, Tonry (1987, 2014) has argued that
including socioeconomic factors violates the ethical proposition that ascribed char-
acteristics for which individuals bear no responsibility, such as race, ethnicity,
gender and age, should not play a role in parole and sentencing decisions.
Similarly, the former Attorney General of the US Justice Department has argued
that sentencing ‘should not be based on unchangeable factors that a person cannot
control’, e.g. the defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background and
neighbourhood (Holder, 2014, italics in original). Moreover, Tonry (2014) has
argued that it is unethical and unjust to punish people for making personal choices
about education, work and living arrangements, especially in societies that highly
values freedom and personal autonomy. In other words, these choices are not
blameworthy in the context of a criminal act (cf. Monahan, 2006). Arguing against
including socioeconomic factors by saying it is a legitimate choice for people to
make seems contrary to arguing that socioeconomic status is outside one’s control.
However, it fits perfectly within a perspective that ignores the role of structural
factors, which logically leads us to holding individuals responsible for making the
‘wrong choices’ and thus for their marginality. The fact that policymakers and
criminal justice actors do not object to punishing individuals either for lawful
personal choices or for factors that are out of their control, expresses dominant
cultural narrative that socioeconomic factors are thought to be ‘under the control
of the offenders and therefore expressions of their inclinations and values’ and
therefore are of ‘moral significance’ (Moore, cited in Monahan, 2006: 398).
Individuals are made responsible for their own socioeconomic status, and thus
seen as blameworthy for not conforming to a mainstream way of life.
Proponents might argue that risk assessment will not stigmatize socioeconomic
marginality because risk assessment tools cannot specify the causes of criminal
behaviour. In fact, Monahan and Skeem (2015) argue that conflating risk and
blame in risk assessment is a ‘category error’: blame and risk play a role in different
types of decisions – that is, first conviction and then sentencing. However, in prac-
tice it would be difficult to keep separate judgements about blame and risk.
Monahan and Skeem have further argued that technically it does not matter
whether risk factors are causal or not, if the goal is not to understand but solely
to predict behaviour. Hence, most factors in risk assessment, especially socioeco-
nomic factors, are rather ‘variable risk factors’: studies have demonstrated their
statistical correlation with recidivism, and they precede recidivism in time, and
while they theoretically can be changed to reduce risk it has not been empirically
determined that they do (Monahan and Skeem, 2015). More precisely, due to a lack
of rigorous testing in randomized control trials it cannot be determined that they
are causal risk factors (Monahan and Skeem, 2015). It is possible, and not unlikely,
that the relation between socioeconomic factors and reoffending is causal for some
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individuals, but spurious or indirect for others. That is, third factors could cause
both re-offending and problems related to education, employment, income and
housing. For example, criminal history is not only predictive of reoffending, but
it also makes it more difficult to get a job, degree or housing, as many employers,
colleges and housing providers exclude people who have a criminal record.
Offending might follow from substance abuse, criminal thinking patterns or anti-
social personality – all factors that according to Monahan and Skeem (2015) have
been identified as causal factors – but each of these factors may also cause socio-
economic problems. Even having ‘antisocial associates’, and thus limited sources of
social capital and encouragement, could affect employment and education in add-
ition to enabling criminal behaviour.
However, denying that risk assessment makes any claims to causality between
socioeconomic marginality and offending conflicts with the claim that advanced
risk/needs assessment tools would be superior exactly because they are theory-
driven (Andrews and Bonta, 2010). After all, Andrews and Bonta, as did the
developers of the COMPAS, set out to address criminogenic factors. But even if
the instruments would be purely data-driven, it is a rather technical argument that
draws attention away from the social context in which risk assessment operates and
the way in which people attach meaning to it. The scientific language and confusing
terminology, especially around ‘dynamic risk factors’ which are also often called
‘criminogenic needs’, make it difficult for people, including legal professionals, to
understand that very few items, if any, included in risk assessment tools have been
proved to cause criminal behaviour or reoffending. Hence, the danger of ‘slippage
between risk prediction and individual causation’ is real (Hannah-Moffat, 2013:
273). Even among practitioners, who are generally not trained in statistics but are
trained in interpreting these tools, correlation tends to become causation (Hannah-
Moffat, 2013). Slippages between correlation and causation are frequently made in
professional descriptions of risk assessment. For example, the OASys manual states
that it is used to ‘help assessors in understanding the ‘‘why’’ of offending’ (National
Offender Management Service (NOMS), 2009: 8) and the COMPAS manual details
the criminological theories that ‘help us understand more about why people make
their behavioural choices’ (Northpointe, 2012: 6). An additional complication
follows from the merging of risk and needs in current ‘risk/need assessment
tools’. Third- and fourth-generation tools are seen as superior to second-generation
tools, because they include not only static factors (e.g. criminal history) but also
‘dynamic risk factors’ (e.g. socioeconomic factors), which are also often called
‘criminogenic needs’ (Baird, 2009; Hannah-Moffat, 2005). However, as Baird
points out, while ‘the mere existence of a need does not always mean it is ‘‘crim-
inogenic’’’, labelling needs as criminogenic ‘[implies] a claim about causality that
generally far exceeds what can legitimately be concluded from the assessment data’
(2009: 9). If anything, including socioeconomic factors in risk assessment tools thus
is likely to convey the message that socioeconomic marginality causes reoffending,
thereby attaching a stigma not only to marginalized offenders but also to socio-
economic marginality in itself. Risk assessment involves a process of negative
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identification of underprivileged offender categories by classifying them as higher
risk, thus justifying higher sentences, which consequently impacts convicted indi-
viduals’ opportunities to maintain or improve their quality of life and wellbeing.
The cultural process of negative identification, or stigmatization, as described in
detail in the above, is accompanied by a process of rationalization (cf. Silver, 2000).
While Lamont and colleagues seem to theorize that rationalization could in itself
produce inequality, it might be more plausible to follow Silver’s (2000) analysis that
rationalization works to conceal the ways in which criminal justice policies and
practices engage in social classification. Of particular importance is that standar-
dized decision-making is seen to make decisions ‘neutral’ and ‘fair’ (Lamont et al.,
2014: 591). More concretely, the rational, scientific and ‘value-neutral’ approach to
sentencing works to obscure the ways in which risk assessment attaches a stigma to
certain individual characteristics (Silver, 2000). Put differently, the stigmatization
of socioeconomic marginality is accomplished ‘under the ideological banners of
reason and rationality’ (Silver, 2000: 125). The social sciences, Silver argues, con-
tribute to the rational sorting out of deserving and undeserving offender categories
in at least two ways. First, by advancing technologies for managing populations –
in this case by developing, testing and advancing risk assessment tools. Second, by
providing an interpretive framework which justifies population management – here
we can think in particular of the frameworks of ‘evidence-based practices’ and
‘what works’, the criminological theories that inform risk assessment (notably
Andrews and Bonta’s (2010) social-psychological theory), and the focus on pre-
dictive validity and general applicability in evaluating risk assessment tools.
Fundamental ethical questions (e.g. regarding bias, individual responsibility) are
neglected as scientific rigor becomes the ethical criterion for judging risk assessment
tools (Silver, 2000: 139). The emphasis on validity in scholarly evaluation of risk
assessment, rather than on ethical and social criteria for including or excluding
certain items, proves the dominance of the ‘evidence based’ and ‘what works’
frames.
The use of technical language not merely obscures discrimination, as Starr
(2015) argues, but neutralizes or ‘launders’ it: outcomes that are related to bias
are later taken as neutral measures of offending (Ward, 2015). Another ‘bias-laun-
dering routine’ (Ward, 2015) is the depiction of risk assessment as ‘objective’. The
benefits of actuarial assessment are usually pitted against unstructured clinical
assessment which would have not only poor predictive accuracy but high discrim-
inatory potential as well (Andrews and Bonta, 2010; Hannah-Moffat et al., 2009).
Following this argument, it is discretion that gives room to prejudice and biased
decision-making, while actuarial risk assessment structures decision-making and
thus limits discretion and therefore is ‘objective’ and ‘truthful’ (Hannah-Moffat
et al., 2009: 399). Some proponents thus argue that risk assessment tools are a
solution to subjective and biased decision-making, such as decisions about senten-
cing. For example, a manual for prison and probation officers in the UK states that
risk management is ‘fair and just – justified, non-discriminatory, does not
overintrude on particular groups and that risk management should be
474 Punishment & Society 19(4)
‘SMARTA’ – SMART with an additional A for ‘anti-discriminatory’ (NOMS,
2009: 9). I set aside here the observation of some scholars that in reality structured
risk assessment may rather be an ‘actuarial illusion’ (Hannah-Moffat et al., 2009),
as risk scores can and are overruled by practitioners when their professional judge-
ment deviates from the risk assessment outcome, for example when they think that
marginality should not result in a higher score (see also Ansbro, 2010). The point is
that objectivity is similarly an illusion, as biased or prejudiced decision-making is
merely replaced with a standardized procedure that has a built-in bias against
socioeconomic marginality. In summary, rationalization works to legitimize stig-
matization and thus the reproduction of marginality and inequality through risk-
based sentencing procedures.
Towards critical assessment and debate
Thirty years ago, Tonry observed that ‘almost everyone who writes about predict-
ive sentencing seems uncomfortable with it’ (1987: 400). That certainly has chan-
ged. In general, risk assessment is now seen as a solution to many problems, even
mass incarceration. Many scholars, also those who raise questions about potential
biases, engage in improving risk assessment tools rather than evaluating them
within a moral and social context (cf. Silver, 2000). Furthermore, while the practice
of including socioeconomic factors in risk assessment tools has been scrutinized in
relation to racial/ethnic and gender bias, much less has been said about socio-
economic bias as a problem in itself. Harcourt (2007) suggests that as individual
traits are deemed to be more closely related to criminal behaviour, the less prob-
lematic they are deemed in terms of discrimination. This might be why racial/ethnic
bias is viewed as more troublesome than socioeconomic bias: there seems to be
consensus among criminal justice actors, as well as among many criminologists
who develop, test and advocate for risk assessment tools, that socioeconomic
factors are related to reoffending – and offending more generally – and that this
justifies including them in risk assessment and sentencing decisions, so as to con-
tribute to public safety. However, this should in my view not be a reason to forego
a critical assessment of whether or not to include socioeconomic factors, especially
given that individuals who come before a judge often are underprivileged already.
A built-in socioeconomic bias in risk assessment tools will contribute to and pro-
duce disparities in sentencing. It is therefore remarkable, as Starr (2014) has noted,
that in the US risk assessment has widespread support as a solution to mass incar-
ceration: if risk assessment is to reduce mass incarceration, Starr argues, it should
single out marginalized groups for diversion, instead of punishing them more
severely. In the US, where calls for reforming the criminal justice system, spurred
by concerns about the costs (financial and social) of mass incarceration, are grow-
ing louder, there is momentum to introduce policies and practices that avoid the
devastating impact on socioeconomically marginalized communities (as well as
communities of colour). But the problem is not limited to the US. Also in other
countries, risk assessment is promoted because of its promise of fair and equal
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decision-making. Although in other countries the call to reform sentencing policies
and practices may be less urgent, risk assessment nonetheless is welcomed as a way
to cope with diminished budgets and resources as well as ongoing quests to protect
the public from offenders. With this article, I hope to have made clear that, despite
claims of objectivity and fairness, risk assessment tools in their current form are not
unbiased. In addition to potential racial/ethnic and gender bias, the built-in socio-
economic bias is problematic in itself, for it produces disparities in sentencing.
Moreover, sentencing that is based on the socioeconomic status of individuals
might work as a process that reproduces and perhaps exacerbates social inequal-
ities in quality of life, opportunities and wellbeing more generally. Particularly
given longstanding concerns about socioeconomic and racial disparities in criminal
justice decision-making, an evaluation of risk assessment should take into account
not only public safety but also unintended societal consequences.
An analysis of the role of risk assessment in sentencing is not only relevant for
those studying, evaluating and advancing risk assessment tools, but also for scho-
lars who have argued that imprisonment produces social inequalities. They have
generally looked at the consequences of prison sentences for individuals’ life
course, particularly opportunities for educational achievement, employment and
income. Risk assessment in its current form may have a contributing role in produ-
cing such adverse effects of imprisonment. For research on the relation between
imprisonment and social inequality, it may thus be valuable to zoom in on specific
components of decision-making processes. The problem of selection effects makes
it difficult to determine whether unequal opportunities after sentencing are related
to sentencing itself. A sociological analytical focus on social or cultural processes
could be of additional help in unravelling the relationship between sentencing
practices on the one hand, and social inequality on the other.
To more fully understand the role of risk assessment in the (unequal) distribution
of resources, opportunities and recognition, we should consider the practice of risk/
needs assessment in its entirety. Needs assessment aims to do exactly the opposite
from what risk assessment does: allocating services and thus (access to) resources to
high-risk offender categories. The identification of social categories through assess-
ment could benefit underprivileged groups, when identification and rationalization
result in distributing resources towards socioeconomically marginalized groups, as
opposed to hindering access to resources. In this way, needs assessment might be a
cultural process that works to decrease social inequality (provided that budgets are
plentiful and that convicted individuals get the services they need). However, the
outcomes of both risk assessment (produces inequality) and needs assessment
(decreases inequality) may conflict with each other to such extent that the rehabili-
tative efforts are undermined when they are accompanied, or preceded, by senten-
cing based on risk assessment. If risk assessment in sentencing produces greater
inequality, rehabilitative efforts based on needs assessment may do little more, if
anything, than repair the inequalities that were produced through risk-based senten-
cing. That is, convicted individuals who are underprivileged face a more severe sen-
tence first, before or combined with access to the resources provided through
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treatment. Risk assessment and need assessment thus may, in the ‘best’ case, rule
each other out, but in the worst case they work together in such a way that social
inequalities are reinforced. Basing sentencing on socioeconomic marginality thus
raises questions about the effectivity of rehabilitative efforts particularly for high-
need offenders who are also at, by definition, high-risk.
An essential additional analytical step is to look at decisions in practice. If risk/
needs assessment is indeed an ‘actuarial illusion’ (Hannah-Moffat et al., 2009),
because decision-makers override the outcome of risk assessment tools, and if
they do so to correct for bias, the discriminatory effects of risk assessment may
be absent or less pronounced. However, disparate outcomes may also be exacer-
bated, when decisions to override or not are based on estimations of deservingness
of individuals. Either way, such practices raise questions about the legitimacy of
including socioeconomic factors in risk assessment tools. To conclude, there are
too many moral and social as well as practical questions that have been glossed
over in the decision to allow the assessment of socioeconomic marginality for
making sentencing decisions. It is hoped that this analysis will stimulate further
research and debate among criminologists and legal scholars, as well as among
policymakers and practitioners in the criminal justice field, assessing risk assess-
ment in light of not only its hoped for result, but also in relation to unintended
social consequences.
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